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THE RACE FOR THE RES: COMPETITION FOR
THE CORPUS OF INTER VIVOS TRUSTS
IN PENNSYLVANIA
S. GORDON ELKINS'-

HE TRUST INTER VIVOS is an inviting target, and various
groups of claimants besiege its corpus. Against these onslaughts,
the trustees fight the good fight. But their battle may have been lost
the very day the trust was born for the attackers' most powerful
artillery is concentrated on the rights retained by the settlor.
Yet-sympathize with the settlor. The res, after all, comes from
him and if tax considerations are not paramount, he may be reluctant
to yield control completely. He would probably like to receive income
during his lifetime. He may want to postpone a final decision as to
beneficiaries or allow for change by retaining power to appoint, revoke
or amend the trust. Further, the settlor sometimes desires to retain
a degree of control or power of approval over the trustees' management.
It is therefore up to the estate planner to explain to the settlor
how the retention of these various rights will affect the trust's validity
and inviolability. The difficulty is that the estate planner may not be
sure himself, for we are dealing with a foggy patch of ocean. This
article will consider two misty areas where judicial decisions inviteand perhaps defy-analysis. The problems are first, when can the
settlor's creditors, present or future, satisfy their claims from trust
corpus; and second, under what circumstances will an inter vivos trust
be deemed "testamentary"?

THE SETTLOR'S CREDITORS AND TRUST CORPUS

While the right of a settlor's creditors to satisfy their claims from
a trust fund is dependent upon the settlor's rights in such funds, the
rights are not congruent.' Neither the settlor nor his creditor can
reach the corpus of a trust if third parties have indefeasibly vested
remainders in it; and both can reach corpus if settlor is a life tenant
t Member, Pennsylvania and Philadelphia Bars.
1. We are here dealing with rights in valid trusts. Creditors have also atteml)ted to reach trust funds on the ground that the trust was invalid, ineffective or
non-existent. See text and notes at page 599, infra.

(590)
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and has the remainder or reversion.2 But differences seem to appear
as to the right to reach principal in comparing two similar types of
trusts. There are, or seem to be differences between the rights of
creditors and their settlor-debtors in each trust and differences between
the creditors' rights to reach the corpus of the two types of trusts. In
both, settlor retains income for life, but in one type of trust he retains
a general power of appointment over the remainder, with named
remaindermen in default of appointment, and in the other trust he
grants the remainder to named persons or classes, but reserves a power
of revocation. In both situations, obviously, a creditor can reach income
since the settlor has the sole interest in it.' The fact that a trust may
be "spendthrift" is irrelevant; a settlor cannot create a spendthrift
4
trust for himself.
The right of creditors to reach the corpus lack such symmetry.
When a settlor retains income for life and a general power of appointment, Pennsylvania cases hold uniformly that the settlor's creditors can
satisfy their claims out of trust principal.5 This is so even if the appointment trust is irrevocable, and even if there are gifts over in default of
appointment to named persons or classes. In this situation, the creditors' right to "invade" principal transcends that of the settlor, who can
appoint beneficiaries of the remainder but generally cannot appropriate
it for his own use.6 On the other hand, when a settlor retains income
for life, names specific remainder beneficiaries, and retains a power of
revocation, it is considered to be law in Pennsylvania that his creditors
2. Egberg v. DeSolms, 218 Pa. 207, 67 Ati. 212 (1907).
Settlors had the
right to apportion corpus among their children, but the gift of corpus to the children
was vested and beyond the reach of settlors' creditors. But cf.. Ghormley v. Smith,
139 Pa. 584, 21 Ati. 135 (1891), where income satisfied creditor's claim but the
decision implied that he could have reached the corpus. As to settlor's rights, where
he is also remainderman see text at page 612 infra.
3. Ghormley v. Smith, supra note 2. See also, Benedict v. Benedict, 261 Pa.
117, 104 Ati. 581 (1918) ; Rienzi v. Goodin, 249 Pa. 546, 95 Ati. 259 (1915) ; Nolan
v. Nolan, 218 Pa. 135, 67 Ati. 52 (1907); Mackason's Appeal, 42 Pa. 330 (1862).
4. Morton v. Morton, 394 Pa. 402, 147 A.2d 150 (1959)
Schellentrager v.
Tradesmen's Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 370 Pa. 501, 88 A.2d 773 (1952); Bowers
Trust Estate, 346 Pa. 85, 29 A.2d 519 (1943). Cf., Chase Trust, 7 Pa. D.&C.2d 519
(Orphans' Ct. Phila. 1956) ; Goodell's Estate, 53 Pa. D. & C. 13, (Orphans' Ct.
Phila. 1945).
5. Whether the settlor was solvent when the trust was created and whether
the claimants were creditors before or after the transfer are irrelevant. The rule is
not grounded on ordinary fraudulent conveyance principles, but on public policy
against a settlor having the enjoyment of a res and yet protecting it from his
creditors. See cases cited in note 3, supra; RESTATEMENT, TRUSrS § 156 (1935)
GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUST §§ 478, 480 (2d ed. 1947).
6. McCreary Trust, 354 Pa. 347, 47 A.2d 235 (1946), where a gift in default
of appointment was to a anamed class - children -and
settlor could not terminate
the trust because other present property interests were created which termination
wouldt prejudice.
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cannot satisfy their claims from the corpus of the trust.7 If this is the
correct interpretation of Pennsylvania law, then the settlor's creditors
must go unpaid from the corpus even though the settlor can help
himself to it by exercising his power of revocation.
It is submitted that the anomalous and undesirable results described above do not necessarily follow from the Pennsylvania decisions
and the principles they enunciate. It is further submitted that there
are no considerations of policy, logic, or even precedent which require
that these two similar situations receive dissimilar treatment. On the
contrary, all analytical approaches indicate that in both trust situations
creditors should be able to reach trust principal.
The basic policy underlying the power of appointment cases is
simply that you cannot have your cake and eat it too. You can put
your property beyond your creditors by giving it away, or you can
keep it, but not both. Time and again, when a settlor has had income
for life, and the power to name the remainder beneficiaries, courts have
held that in reality he still had enjoyment of the property-the equivalent of a fee-and that his creditors could obtain what the settlor
enjoyed.8 Applying this same test to a trust where the settlor has
retained income for life and a power of revocation, any realistic
appraisal makes it clear that the settlor has more control (enjoyment)
over the corpus than he has in a power of appointment trust. First,
the settlor's right of revocation gives him a power to change the
remainder beneficiaries equivalent to that of the settlor with a power
of appointment.' Moreover, the settlor with a power to revoke can
actually regain some or all of the trust corpus, something the appointing settlor may never be able to do. Thus, if a life income settlor with
a power of appointment has the equivalent of a fee, a fortiori, the life
income settlor who can revoke possesses at least as much.
There is another policy reason why creditors should be able to
reach the corpus of a trust revocable by the settlor; that is that one
should be able to do directly what can be done indirectly. Under the
Federal Bankruptcy Act, Sec. 70a (3), a trustee in bankruptcy is
7. Murphey v. C.I.T. Corp., 347 Pa. 591, 33 A.2d 16 (1943) ; Reimold v. Potter
Bank and Trust Co., 17 Pa. D.&C.2d 530, 541 (C.P. Alleg. 1958) ; McKee, The
Validity of Inter Vivos Trusts, 36 PA. B.A.Q. 33, 39-40 (1959).
8. See note 5 supra. It is this writer's position that this rule is eminently sound
as between the settlor and his creditors. But the application of the rule has no
bearing upon the validity of the trust. See pp. 599 to 601, infra.
9. A power to revoke encompasses a power to amend. Schautz' Trust, 395 Pa.
605, 151 A.2d 457 (1959) ; Yost's Estate, 87 Pa. D. & C. 40, 42 (Orphans' Ct.
Phila. 1953); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TRUSTS § 331, comment g (1959) ; 3 SCOT',
TRUSTS § 331.1 (2d ed. 1956). In any event, the settlor could revoke and republish the
trust with substituted beneficiaries. Schautz' Trust, 8 Fiduc. Rep. 677 (Orphans' Ct.
Lack. 1958), aff'd on other grounds, 395 Pa. 605, 151 A.2d 457 (1959).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1960

3

SUMMER

1960]

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 4 [1960], Art. 3
CREDITORS

AND TRUST CORPUS

vested with all rights which the bankrupt could have exercised for his
own benefit, and under Sec. 70a (5), with all property which the
bankrupt "could by any means have transferred". 1" A right of revocation clearly falls within these descriptions."
Thus a creditor who
could not have reached the corpus of a revocable trust in a state
court could obtain the same result through an involuntary petition in
bankruptcy.
An analysis of the property rights created under the two types
of trusts provides no basis for dissimilar treatment of creditors. When
a settlor creates a trust, retaining a life estate and power of revocation,
and naming a remainderman, a vested remainder has been created.' 2
This is a palpable property right with immediate value capable of
being sold or assigned. It is no less vested because of the power of
revocation although the remainder is, of course, subject to divestment
if the power of revocation is exercised.'" Similarly, when the settlor
reserves a life estate and general power of appointment and names a
remainder beneficiary in default of appointment, a vested remainder has
been created to the same extent and of the same type as in the revocable
trust.1 4 The settlor cannot terminate a trust where such a vested remainder exists 5 though the remainder can be divested if the power
of appointment is exercised. In short, both trust dispositions create
identical property rights, and both rights can be nullified by the
settlors' acts. The vital fact is that each right, at creation, was subject
to the control of the settlor. If the settlor's creditors can satisfy claims
from the corpus in one type of trust because of the rights which the
settlor retained, they should equally be allowed to do so in the other. 6
Against these considerations arguing for similar treatment in
both trust situations, there are no countervailing reasons for diverse
10. 30 STAT. 565 (1898)

11. 4

as amended, 11 U.S.C. §§ 110(a)(3), 110(a)(5).

COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY

ff 70.13 (14th ed. 1942);

TRUSTS § 331, comment o (1959).

RESTATEMENT

(SECOND),

It is not so clear that the bankruptcy trustee
can reach the corpus where the settlor has a life income and a power of appointment,
especially if the power is exercisable only by will. 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY
§ 23.19 (Casner ed. 1952).
12. Murphey v. C.I.T. Corp., 347 Pa. 591, 595, 33 A.2d 16, 18 (1943) ; McKean's
Trust, 1 Fiduc. Rep. 26, 31 (Orphans' Ct. Phila. 1950); Cf. Schellentrager v.
Trademen's Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 370 Pa. 501, 504-5, 88 A.2d 773, 774-75 (1952)
Shapley's Trust, 353 Pa. 499, 46 A.2d 227 (1946).
13. See cases cited supra note 12.
14. McCreary's Trust, 354 Pa. 347, 47 A.2d 235 (1946); DeCarlo v. Licini,
156 Pa. Super. 363, 40 A.2d 127 (1944); Reimold v. Potter Bank & Trust Co., 17
Pa. D.&C.2d 530, 537 (C.P. Alleg. 1958); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 157(c), comments o, p, r, illust. 13 (1936).
15. McCreary's Trust, 354 Pa. 347, 47 A.2d 235 (1946); Collins v. Provident
Trust Co. 83 Pa. D. & C. 459, 464 (C.P. Mtgy. 1952).
16. Section 11 of the Estates Act of 1947, PA. STAT. tit. 20 § 301.11 (1947),
recognizes this identity, allowing a surviving spouse to treat as testamentary a conveyance reserving a power of appointment or a power of revocation.
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treatment. One argument put forth as justification for barring creditors
from the corpus of a revocable trust is that a settlor cannot be forced
to exercise the power of revocation in favor of his creditors. In this
view, a power of revocation is something personal to the settlor; an
undetachable right that is buried alongside him. 1 7 It is also suggested
that the result is justified by a solicitude for the cestuis que trust.' 8
These arguments miss the point. When a settlor retains a power of
appointment he is not "forced" to exercise the power in favor of his
creditors, yet they can collect their debts from the corpus. The settlor
may never exercise the power and the corpus may pass to the remaindermen in default of appointment, yet the settlor's creditors can
reach the corpus because he has retained its enjoyment and control.
In the same way, a settlor need not be "forced" to revoke the trust, but
his creditors should be able to reach the corpus because of the substantial enjoyment and control the settlor has retained. No settlor's writing
arm need be twisted.
Similarly, it is equally difficult to see how a power of revocation
is any more personal than a power of appointment, or why beneficiaries
of one trust are entitled to protection from creditors denied beneficiaries
of the other. It is true that allowing creditors to satisfy claims from
the corpus of a revocable trust lessens the value of the remainder
interests but this is equally so in appointment trusts as to remainder
interests in default of appointment. On any analysis, creditors' rights
to the corpus should be the same as to both trusts.
That is what Pennsylvania law should be, but is it? The answer
seems to be that creditors of settlors of both types of trust can reach
the corpus, but creditors in revocable trust situations will have to clear
some decisional hurdles to do so. It is crystal clear that creditors of a
life estate settlor with a power of appointment can reach the corpus.
Since Mackason's Appeal was decided in 1862,19 courts have held consistently that such a settlor has the equivalent of a fee and that to
bar his creditors (even on post-trust debts) from the corpus would bc
17. See cases and authorities cited supra note 7. See also, Trusts-Inter Vivos
or Testamentary? For What Purposes?, 99 U. PA. L. REv. 879 (1951). Cf., Dolan's
Estate, 279 Pa. 582, 589, 124 Atl. 176, 180 (1924) ("the right to revoke, unexercised, is a dead thing").
18. Trusts-Intcr Vivos or Testamentary? For What Purposes?, 99 U. PA.
L. REv. 879, 884 (1951), cites but disapproves cases containing this justification and
the principle it supports. The cases cited as indicating such paternalism for the
trust's beneficiaries all involve insurance policies where there is statutory authority
for favoring beneficiaries. See e.g., Stutzman v. Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co., 315
Pa. 47, 172 Atl. 302 (1934) ; Fidelity Trust Co. v. Union Nat'l Bank, 313 Pa. 467,
169 Atl. 209 (1934).
19. 42 Pa. 330 (1862).
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a fraud and against public policy. In Mackason's Appeal, the gift in
default of appointment was to the settlor's heirs, but the case has since
been followed without exception, even where the gift over was to
named persons or classes and the trust was irrevocable.2"
The rights of creditors of a life estate settlor with power to revoke
were not specifically before a court until the past two decades. But
as early as 1886, a decision equated creditors' rights in revocable and
appointment trusts. In Dickerson's Appeal,2 a settlor created various
trusts by declaration and in one trust, declared for his daughter, retained both a life estate and a right to revoke. At his death, the settlor's
widow attacked the trusts as testamentary, but the court held them
valid inter vivos. The lower court decision, in discussing the revocable
trust for the daughter, stated that it was valid against the widow
although the trust ".

.

. in view of Mackason's Appeal, . . . could not

be sustained against creditors."2 2 The supreme court affirmed, approving the decision below, and observing that the trust, unrevoked, was
clearly valid "against everybody except creditors. ' 23 Thus the Dickerson dictum promised creditors of a life tenant-settlor of a revocable
trust access to corpus equal to creditors' rights in appointment trusts.
But when creditors went after the corpus of a revocable trust
in Murphey v. C.I.T. Corp., the court barred the way. 24 There a
husband and wife transferred entireties property to a spendthrift trust,
income to both or the survivor for life, remainder to named persons,
the spouses or the survivor also reserving the right to revoke. The
wife had died and the husband's creditor claimed the right to satisfaction from income and corpus. The court allowed creditors to attach
income on the ground that a settlor could not create a spendthrift trust
for himself. But the court held that the corpus was inviolate because
the trust was not testamentary, and created present interests in remaindermen, and because the creditor could not "force" the settlor to
revoke. The court never considered the analogy of the case to decisions
involving such creditors' rights in appointment trusts although, ironically, it relied upon Dickerson's Appeal.
20. Benedict v. Benedict, 261 Pa. 117, 104 Atl. 581 (1918) (gift to widow and
children irrevocable); Rienzi v. Goodin, 249 Pa. 546, 95 Atl. 259 (1915) (irrevocable) ; Ghormley v. Smith, 139 Pa. 584, 21 Atl. 135 (1891) (irrevocable).
21. 115 Pa. 198, 8 Ati. 64 (1886).
22. Id. at 198, 8 Atl. at 65. The lower court decision is printed directly before
the supreme court decision.
23. Id. at 210, 8 AtI. at 69.
24. Murphey v. C.I.T. Corp., supra note 12, is considered the leading case in
Pennsylvania for the proposition that the settlor's creditors cannot reach the corpus.
of a revocable trust even where the settlor is a life tenant. See e.g., Reimold v.
Potter Bank & Trust Co., 17 Pa. D.&C.2d 530, 541-2 (C.P. Alleg. 1958) (dictum)
M1cKce, The Validity of Inter Vivos Trusts, 31 PA. B.A.Q. 33, 39-40 (1959).
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It is possible to devise a reasonable basis for distinguishing the
Murphey decision by reading it in light of an earlier case arising from
the same trust, C.I.T. Corp. v. Flilnt.2 5 In the Flint case, the husband's judgment creditor had attempted, but failed, to set aside the
trust as a fraudulent conveyance. The court upheld the trust on the
ground that the property transferred had never been owned by the
husband or subject to his debts; rather it was owned by the entireties
and the entireties, not the husband, was the settlor. 2' The court expressly stated that if the husband had owned the property individually
and retained life income and a power of revocation, his creditors could
have reached the corpus, citing the power of appointment cases.2 7 But
the court also reaffirmed a settlor's right to create such interests-life
estate and power of disposition over remainder-in other beneficiaries
and to protect such interests from their creditors.28 Such a conveyance
is not a fraud on the beneficiary's creditors for the trust property does
not emanate from the debtor, and whatever property rights are conferred on the beneficiary do not diminish his creditors' protection.
Actually, the only issue ripe for decision in Flint was whether the
conveyance was fraudulent. The creditor had also argued that, since
the wife's death, the husband "owned" the trust property and the
remainders were only testamentary transfers. This was left undecided
and was the question on which Murphey passed.
With this background, Murphey should make sense. All the
court had to remember was that the entireties was the settlor, and the
husband was only a beneficiary: The husband's creditors could not
reach entireties property, so the creation of the trust was no fraud on
them, even if the beneficiary-debtor had control over the corpus' ultimate disposition. The creditors could not force the beneficiary to
revoke, and they had no other.claim on the property since it did not
emanate from their debtor. Unfortunately, Murphey does not quite
conform to this analysis. There, the court allowed the creditors to
attach the husbanq's interest in income. If the husband was deemed
25. 333 Pa. 350, 5 A.2d 126 (1939).
26. Id. at 353-4, 5 A.2d at 127-28. The lower court ignored the "...
anomalous,
indeed, unique, nature of tenancy by entireties." "The vital feature . . . is that the
property was not one in which Flint had an individualized interest. The title legal
and equitable, was in . . . a distinct legal entity .... " the entireties.
27. Id. at 353, 5 A.2d at 127. "[Ilf Flint had owned the property . . . individually .. .and had executed such a deed of trust, the conveyance would have been
in fraud of both his existing and future creditors. One cannot create a spendthrift
trust in property for his own benefit, nor . . . exclude creditors while retaining the
beneficiary interests and the incidents of ownership and control, as, for example,
by . . . [spendthrift trust, life estate to himself] . . . with remainder to the use of
his appointees by will, and in default of appointment, to the use of his heirs:
(citing
.
power of appointment cases). [Emphasis supplied].
28. Id. at 354, 5 A.2d at 129.
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to be a beneficiary, then the sprendthrift provisions should have been
effective as to this interest. The court circumvented this difficulty
by holding that the life estate had been reserved to the entireties (the
settlor) and that the spendthrift provisions could therefore not apply

even when that estate vested in the husband on his wife's death. The
court's treatment of the power of revocation is less clear. The holding
that the husband's creditor could not reach the corpus does not seem
to be based on the fact that the husband held that right as a beneficiary.
If anything, it intimates that revocation was reserved to the entireties
and passed to the surviving husband. The basis stated for that holding
is that the creditor cannot "force" the husband to revoke, and the only
authority cited is the Restatement of Trusts, Sec. 330, comment "o"

which states that a power of revocation "reserved by the settlor" cannot
be reached by his creditors.
Read together, Flint and Murphey blur. The statement in Flint

that if the husband had been the settlor, his creditors could reach the
trust corpus appears at odds with the Restatement "rule", as cited in
Murphey, relative to settlors. It should be emphasized that the main

issue argued in Murphey was whether the trust was valid inter vivos
or merely testamentary. Obviously, the trust was valid but that does
not necessarily decide whether creditors can reach the corpus. The
analogy to creditors' rights in appointment trust cases was not clearly
met in the Murphey decision. What is clear is that the creditor who
tried to reach the corpus was not the creditor of the settlor (the entireties) but of the husband. Despite the ambivalent characterization
of the husband's position (settlor or beneficiary) vis-A-vis his enjoyment and control over the trust in Murphey, it is submitted that in
fact the Murphey decision should be interpreted under the Flint
rationale. The Restatement rule, as interpreted, produces nonsensical
results and Murphey need not and should not be read as adopting such
a rule.29 Moreover, Comment "o" to Sec. 330 of the Restatement
29. Unfortunately, the Murphey case and § 330, comment a of the Restatement
of Trusts have been interpreted as promulgating the rule that creditors of a settlor
with a life estate and power to revoke cannot reach the corpus; Reimold v. Potter
Bank & Trust Co., 17 Pa. D.&C.2d 530, 541-42 (C.P. Alleg. 1958) ; McKee, The
Validity of Inter Vivos Trusts, 31 PA. B.A.Q. 33, (1959). RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
TRuSTS § 330, comment o (1959), contains the same rules as the original edition.
Other than Murphey, the cases cited in the Pennsylvania Annotations to § 330,
comment a of the RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS are inapposite. Fidelity Trust Co. v.
Union Nat'l Bank of Pittsburgh, 313 Pa. 467, 169 Atl. 209 (1934) (insurance trust:
after settlor's death, his creditors cannot reach proceeds even though settlor could
have revoked during his life, a case turning largely on the statutory protections of
insurance proceeds from creditors); Fleming's Estate, 217 Pa. 610, 66 At. 874
p1907) (creditors cannot compel debtor to take against his wife's will) ; Potter v.
Fidelity ins. Trust & Safe-Deposit Co. (No. 2), 100 Pa. 366, 49 Atl. 86 (1901). (a
premarital trust is not a fraud on settlor's wife) ; Mullihan's Estate, 157 Pa. 98, 27
Atl. 398 (1893) (executor cannot be forced to claim commissions).
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of Trusts-the only authority Murphey cites for its decision-was misinterpreted. Sec. 330 of both the First and Second Restatement of
Trusts merely states that the settlor can revoke a trust to the extent
he reserved that power. Comment "o" speaks only of a settlor with
power to revoke. It does not cover the situation of a settlor with power
to revoke and a life estate. This distinction is highlighted by reading
Sec. 156, Comment "c" of the same Restatement which allows a
settlor's creditors to reach principal if the settlor reserves "not only
a life interest but also a general power to appoint the remainder ....
Thus Comment "o'" of Sec. 330 should be read as barring the settlor's
creditors where he has retained power to revoke but no life estate."0
Perhaps in Pennsylvania a creditor cannot force a settlor to revoke
where other persons are both income and remainder beneficiaries, 3
but this does not and should not alter the rule that a settlor with a
life estate and control over the disposition of corpus possesses the fee
as far as the creditors are concerned. With the Restatement rule in
proper perspective, there is no basis for the Murphey decision, and it
must either be interpreted narrowly as turning on the entireties conveyance, or fall.
If there has been any doubt as to whether creditors of a settlor
in revocable and appointment trusts are to be treated similarly in
Pennsylvania, it should be dispelled by the recent supreme court
decision in Morton v. Morton.3 2 In that case, the settlor created a trust

with income to himself for life, and the remainder to named persons.
The settlor further reserved the right to add or substitute beneficiaries,
or to vary their shares, by his own act, 33 but he could not amend other
trust provisions without trustee approval. The trust was expressly
declared to be irrevocable and contained "spendthrift" provisions.
Creditors of the settlor,34 whose claims could not be completely satisfied
30. This same distinction is made in 3 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 330.12 (2d ed. 1956).
Mr. Scott records the rule that the creditors can reach the corpus where settlor
is a trust beneficiary with a power of appointment. He then discusses the situation
where a settlor has reserved power to revoke but "has not reserved a beneficial
interest. . . ." and states that, generally, settlor's creditors are there barred from the
corpus.
31. In several states, statutes allow settlor's creditors to reach the corpus even
if only a power to revoke is reserved. ALA. CoDE ANN. tit. 47, § 75 (1940) ; FLA.
STAT. § 726.08 (1957); IND. STAT. ANN. § 56-610 (Burns 1933); KAN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 67-414 (1949) ; MICH. STAT. ANN. § 26.104 (1937) ; MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 502.76 (1945) ; N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 45; N.D. Rev. CODE § 59-5035 (1943)
OHro REv. CODE § 1335.01 (Baldwin 1958) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 267 (1949)
S.D. ConE § 59.0444 (1939) ; WIS. STAT. § 232-13 (1955).
32. 394 Pa. 402, 147 A.2d 150 (1959).
33. The settlor had actually exercised his right to change beneficiaries several
times.
34. Settlor's wife and her attorneys. While a wife is a favored creditor, Stewart's
Estate, 334 Pa. 356, 5 A.2d 910 (1939), the attorneys are not, and the court's decision
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from income, attempted to reach the corpus of the trust. The court
held that the creditors could reach the corpus, citing as authority the
power of appointment cases. In other words, the court held that a
settlor retaining income for life and the power to change beneficiaries
has sufficient enjoyment or control over the trust so that his creditors
can reach the corpus." The Morton rationale must of necessity govern
the revocable trust cases. This is absolutely certain since the supreme
court's decision in Schautz Trust36 that a power of revocation includes
a power of amendment. Thus, a settlor with a life estate and power
of revocation has as much and more interest in and control over his
trust than the settlor in the Morton case, and it must follow that his
creditors can also reach the corpus.
With Morton, the supreme court has obliquely but definitively
settled the question of whether revocable trusts should be treated differently from power of appointment trusts vis-A.-vis the settlor's creditors.

7

In declaring similar treatment for both types of trusts, the court has
clarified a clouded question of law in consonance with the realities of
the situation and in accordance with the underlying considerations
of policy.
CIRCUMVENTING THE INTER Vivos TRUST

Despite the increasing use of the "living trust" there are many who
wish it were dead. Various claimants attempt to insert their claims to
trust corpus ahead or instead of beneficiaries, by denying that the trust
ever existed or was operative inter vivos. These claimants include
the surviving spouse," the estate or heirs of the settlor,39 creditors,40
is not based on the wife's special situation, but applies to any creditors of the

settlor.

35. This precise question has rarely been decided. An excellent discussion of the
entire question, reaching the same conclusion as the Morton case, is found in Cooke's
Trust Co. v. Lord, 41 Hawaii 198 (1955).
36. 395 Pa. 605, 151 A.2d 457 (1959).
37. The question of Morton's effect on Murphey v. C.I.T. Corp. must be left
open. Murphey has either been overruled or must be limited to trusts created by the
entireties. If the latter, a settlor might reach for insulation from his creditors by
first conveying property to the entireties and having it create the trust. Such subterfuge can be minimized by judicial scrutiny. If the trust's creation had been preceded
by a conveyance to the entireties, the entireties should be deemed an agent and
the transferring spouse the settlor. Cf., Sheasley's Trust, 366 Pa. 316, 77 A.2d 448
(1951) ; King v. York Trust Co., 278 Pa. 141, 122 Atl. 227 (1923).
38. See e.g., Windolph v. Girard Trust Co., 245 Pa. 349, 91 Ati. 634 (1914)
Lines v. Lines, 142 Pa..149, 21 Atl. 809 (1891) ; Vederman Estate, 78 Pa. D. & C.
207 (Orphans' Ct. Phila. 1951) ; Hurley's Estate, 17 Pa. D. & C. 637 (Orphans' Ct.
Phila. 1932).
39. See e.g., Beaumont's Estate, 214 Pa. 445, 63 Att. 1023 (1906) ; Reese's
Estate, 317 Pa. 473, 177 At. 792 (1931) ; Pengelly Estate, 374 Pa. 358, 97 A.2d
844 (1953).
40. See e.g., Kenin's Trust Estate, 343 Pa. 549, 23 A.2d 837 (1942). Cf.,
Reiniger's Estate, 36 Pa. D. & C. 163 (Orphans' Ct. Berks 1939).
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the Commonwealth, 1 and, quite frequently, the disgruntled settlor
himself." It is possible to distill four main contentions used to attack
trusts inter vivos which have been in fashion over the years. First,
the trust is "testamentary" because made for the settlor's convenience;
second, the trust is "testamentary" because it is a mere agency controlled by the settlor; third, the trust is revocable because fraudulently
made irrevocable; fourth, the trust is terminable or testamentary
because it creates no new property interests.
Out of this unremitting legal battle has come a welter of decisional
law concerning the validity of inter vivos trusts. While these cases
have provided some illumination they have, to a large extent, commingled the principles underlying all four attacks on such trusts, thus
injecting confusion into an already amorphous area. Hurley's Estate,4"
is an apt illustration. There, the settlor created a trust naming a bank
as trustee, with income payable to him for life and, at his death, remainder to designated grandchildren. The settlor retained power to
amend or revoke. On its face the trust appears perfectly valid creating
a vested remainder in the grandchildren subject to divestment by revocation.44 But the court held, without any evidence but the trust deed,
that the conveyance was "testamentary" and for the settlor's personal
convenience and that, therefore, no present interests were created
relying on Frederick's Appeal and Rick's Appeal.45 As to the power
of revocation, the court remarked that if the document is "testamentary"
it is revocable whether it contains the power or not, but the existence
of the power, while it implies an intent to create a valid deed of trust,
is not controlling. Yet later in the opinion, the court pointed to the
power of revocation as one item indicating the testamentary nature of
the conveyance! On rehearing, the court indicated another basis for
its decision by emphasizing that the trust ended at the settlor's death
and the res was then payable to the remainderman, just as under a will.
Hurley typically utilizes most of the generalizations found in these
41. See e.g., Glosser Trust, 355 Pa. 210, 49 A.2d 401 (1946) ; Myers' Estate,
309 Pa. 581, 164 Atl. 611 (1932).
42. See e.g., Schellentrager v. Tradesmen's Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 379 Pa. 501,
88 A.2d 773 (1952); Bowers' Trust Estate, 346 Pa. 85, 29 A.2d 519 (1943); Rehr
v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 310 Pa. 301, 165 Atl. 380 (1933); Sturgeon v.
Stevens, 186 Pa. 350, 40 Ati. 488 (1898) ; Long v. Tradesmen's Nat'l Bank, 108 Pa.
Super. 363, 165 Atl. 56 (1938) ; Chase's Estate, 7 D.&C.2d 519 (Orphans' Ct. Phila.
1956).
43. 16 Pa. D. & C. 521 (Orphans' Ct. Phila. 1931), petition for review dismissed, 17 Pa. D. & C. 637 (Orphans' Ct. Phila. 1932).
44. Shapley's Trust, 353 Pa. 499, 46 A.2d 227 (1946); Lyons' Trust, 164 Pa.
Super. 140, 63 A.2d 415 (1949); Reimold v. Potter Bank & Trust Co., 17 Pa.
D.&C.2d 530 (C.P. Alleg. 1958) McKean's Trust, 71 Pa. D. & C. 429 (Orphans'
Ct. Phila. 1951).
45. Frederick's Appeal, 52 Pa. 338 (1886); Rick's Appeal, 105 Pa. 528 (1884).
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cases, in rather circular fashion. Thus a purported trust inter vivos
is nugatory if "testamentary"; it is "testamentary" if the deed is for
the personal convenience of the settlor and creates no present interests
in others; and it creates no present interests if it is intended to take
place at death-in other words, if it is testamentary. None of these
abstractions gives any meaningful decision-making content to the
others, and judges must and do resort to more factual material. The
mingling of these principles results from the jumbling together of
decisions based upon all four attacks made on inter vivos trusts. In the
process, principles intended to operate very narrowly have been converted into broad rules of law.
When Is An Inter Vivos Trust Testamentary? The Saga
Of Frederick's Appeal.
One of the warhorse cases in the battle against the inter vivos
trust is Frederick'sAppeal,46 a decision whose treatment by the courts
would gladden the heart of any reader of Lewis Carroll. The case has
been distinguished, criticized, restricted to its facts, and even declared
defunct, yet it has survived to be cited again and again with approval."7
In Frederick's Appeal, the settlor created a trust in 1853 and later
tried, but failed, to cancel it on the grounds of fraud and weakmindedness. In 1865, the settlor executed a paper "revoking" the trust and
in his will treated the trust res as part of his estate. The deed of trust
recited that the settlor had suffered losses and debts because of his old
and feeble condition, that he was incapable of handling his estate, and
that the trust would spare him "much care and trouble." The trustees
were to support the settlor for life and divide the res among his children
one year after his death. The court emphasized the voluntary nature
of the deed and held that its manifest intent was to promote the
settlor's convenience and protect his own interests. In other words,
46. S:-pra, note 45.
47. Mason's Estate, 395 Pa. 485, 150 A.2d 542 (1959) (approved); Curry's
Appeal, 390 Pa. 105, 134 A.2d 497 (1957) (declared defunct); Pengelly Estate, 374
Pa. 358, 97 A.2d 844 (1953) (approved); Damiani v. Lobasco, 367 Pa. 1, 79 A.2d
268 (1951) (limited) ; Shapley's Trust, 353 Pa. 499, 46 A.2d 22 (1946) (approved) ;
Tunnell's Estate, 325 Pa. 554, 190 Atl. 906 (1937) (approved); Beaumont's Estate,
214 Pa. 445, 63 Atd. 1023 (1906) (followed) ; Kraft v. Neuffer, 202 Pa. 558, 52 Atl.
100 (1902) (restricted); Potter v. Fidelity Ins. Trust & Safe-Deposit Co. (No. 1),
199 Pa. 360, 49 Atl. 85 (1901) (restricted) ; Rynd v. Baker, 193 Pa. 486, 44 Atl.
551 (1899)
(restricted)
Wilson v. Anderson, 186 Pa. 531, 40 Atl. 1096 (1898)
(restricted); Sturgeon v. Stevens, 186 Pa. 350, 40 Atl. 488 (1898)
(approved);
Chestnut St. Nat'l Bank v. Fidelity Ins. Trust & Safe-Deposit Co., 186 Pa. 333, 40
Atl. 486 (1898) (followed) ; Rick's Appeal, 105 Pa. 528 (1884) (followed) ; Mack's
Appeal, 68 Pa. 231 (1871) (distinguished); Hurley's Estate, 16 Pa. D. & C. 521
(Orphans' Ct. Phila. 1931) (followed) ; Hill's Estate, 15 Pa. D. & C. 699 (Orphans'
Ct. Phila. 1931) (approved).
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it was not really a trust at all but simply an agency relationship and
therefore no interests were created in the children "remaindermen".
Any disposition of the corpus to them was intended to take place after
their father's death. At most, it was a testamentary disposition or
will, superseded by the later will. Even in its day, Frederick's Appeal
was rather extraordinary, for cases both before and shortly after it
sustained inter vivos trusts as valid, even when the settlor had retained
a life estate,4 8 and there was no element of fraud involved. Yet the
case has fathered two lines of cases holding inter vivos trusts to be
testamentary: (1) if the trust is for the settlor's personal convenience; (2) if the settlor has retained a life estate with control over
management.
Trusts Testamentary Because For Settlor's
Personal Convenience.
The court in Frederick's Appeal laid heavy emphasis on the fact
that the trust was a voluntary (non-contractual) conveyance and that
it was for the settlor's personal convenience and thus a mere agency.
Deeds of trust are generally voluntary conveyances and one may
assume that if a trust did not suit a settlor's convenience he would not
create it. Neither factor seems sufficient ground for ignoring trust
conveyances. Yet this aspect of the case, what we shall call the personal convenience doctrine of Frederick's Appeal, has had considerable
vogue. Thus, in Rick's Appeal,4" where the court could have allowed
revocation on the ground of fraudulent inducement, it instead chose
to hold that the trust was for the settlor's personal convenience, thus
a mere agency, testamentary and therefore revocable. Sturgeon v.
Stevens,"° involved a trust created by a mother because of her son's
anxiety to see that he got the fund at her death. The mother retained
a life interest and the court held the conveyance testamentary, citing
Frederick's Appeal. Again, in Chestnut Street National Bank &
Fidelity Insurance Trust and Safe Deposit Co."' where the settlor
retained a life estate, remainder to her sons, the court held that because
of the retention of the life estate the trust must be deemed a mere
agency for her personal convenience and thus testamentary, following
Frederick's Appeal. In Beaumont Estate,52 the settlor put bonds in
48. Dickerson's Appeal, 115 Pa. 198, 8 Atl. 64 (1887) ; Ashurst's Appeal, 77
Pa. 464 (1875) ; Greenfield's Estate, 14 Pa. 489 (1850) ; Reese v. Ruth, 13 S. & R.
435 (Pa. 1825).
49. 105 Pa. 528 (1884) ; see text at page 610, infra.
50. 186 Pa. 350, 40 Atl. 488 (1898).
51. 186 Pa. 333, 40 At. 486 (1898).
52. 214 Pa. 445, 63 At. 1023 (1906).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1960

13

SUMMER

1960]

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 4 [1960], Art. 3
CREDITORS

AND TRUST CORPUS

trust to use their income for payment of insurance premiums. The
proceeds of the policies were to be paid to named persons, but not to
his wife who claimed the property as administratrix. A right to revoke
was retained but not exercised. The court held that the trust was
for the settlor's personal convenience, citing Frederick's Appeal, and
gave the proceeds to the estate. The personal convenience doctrine has
obvious appeal to an advocate for when all else is lost he can attack the
trust as one for the settlor's personal convenience and thus a mere
agency. Nevertheless, this principle of Frederick's Appeal has been
sharply criticized, restricted and left for dead." Even so, the corpse
was lively enough as late as 1932 to be the basis for the decision in
Hurley's Estate, supra. But when the principle was recently relied
upon in Curry Appeal,54 the supreme court took the occasion to announce that: "There is no vitality remaining in this doctrine of
Frederick's Appeal and its following; these cases do not declare the
law in Pennsylvania." 55 Requiescat in pace-maybe.5 6
Trusts Testamentary Because Of Settlor's Life Estate And Control
Of Management; The Details Of Administration Rule.
Whether the personal convenience doctrine has been laid to rest
or not Frederick'sAppeal has also been cited by the courts as authority
for another, more vexatious, principle; a recent doctrine sometimes
called the "mere agency" rule. This doctrine concedes that a trust is
not rendered invalid even if the settlor reserves a life estate and power
to revoke. But if, in addition, the settlor reserves the power to control
the trustee as to the details of the trust's administration, the trust is
a mere agency and testamentary.5 7 The authority most frequently
cited for this proposition is dictum in Shapley Trust.5" In Shapley, the
court held that an inter vivos deed was not testamentary and that the
53. In Wilson v. Anderson, 186 Pa. 531, 538, 40 Atl. 1096, 1098 (1898), the
court declared that Frederick's Appeal "stands by itself; it is not authority for the
sweeping proposition that every voluntary trust [whose grantor has a life estate]
• . . is a testamentary instrument. . . . We do not favor an extension of the doctrine of Frederick's Appeal supra, an exceptional case. . . . " Yet 186 Pa. also reports Sturgeon v. Stevens, at 350, and the Chestnut St. Nat'l Bank case at 333,
which rely on Frederick's Appeal. See also, cases supra note 47.
54. 390 Pa. 105, 134 A.2d 497 (1957).
55. Id. at 111, 134 A.2d at 500.
56. Shapley's Trust, 353 Pa. 499, 501, 46 A.2d 227, 228 (1946) cites Hurley's
Estate and Frederick's Appeal, with approval, and that portion of Shapley was
quoted with approval in Mason's Estate, 395 Pa. 485, 491, 150 A.2d 542, 546 (1959).
See Bookstaver, Trusts, 20 U. PiTT. L. REv. 401, 407 (1958).
57. RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS, § 57 (1935). Section 57(2) states the details of administration rule. Section 57(3) deals with declaration of trusts, stating that where
settlor reserves a life estate, power to revoke and the right to do as he pleases with
the property, it is testamentary.
58. 353 Pa. 499, 46 A.2d 22 (1946).
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reserved power to revoke had not been exercised. However, the court
went on to enunciate the "details of administration" rule citing
Frederick's Appeal and other cases as support for the rule, although
the cases are not really in point. In Frederick's Appeal, the settlor
retained no control over trust management; he created the trust precisely because he was incompetent to manage his own affairs and the
court held that for that reason the trust was a mere agency created
for the settlor's convenience. The other cases cited by Shaplhy also
are based on the "personal convenience" doctrine and are similarly
not in point. 9 This confusion of precedent stems from the fact that
the Frederick's Appeal case and the Shaplcy Trust dictum both operate
to reduce a trust to a "mere agency". There is no other similarity and
the "personal convenience" cases cannot be deemed authority for
Shapley's "details of administration" doctrine. This doctrine is of
relatively recent vintage in Pennsylvania and emanates from Section
57 (2) of the Restatement of Trusts. It is undesirable both in theory
and in practice.
The theory underlying the rule against allowing the settlor to
control the management of an inter vivos trust is that he has retained
all the indices of a fee. It is conceded that a settlor can retain a life
estate and also a power of revocation. If he can also control the management and investment of the trust res, the argument runs, he has
parted with nothing6" and the trustee only carries out the settlor's
orders. Although the "details of administration" cases habitually cite
Frederick's Appeal and its progeny,61 they gain no strength from these
inapposite holdings. Thus the theory must defend itself without benefit
of such hoary precedent.
Let us test the theory against an example. A creates a trust
naming B bank as trustee, directing income to be paid to him for life,
and to C for life after A's death with remainder payable at the death
of C to D. A retains a power to revoke the trust but this in no way
affects the inter vivos validity of the trust. 2 The trust is equally un59. The Shapley dictum also cited Turner v. Scott, 51 Pa. 126 (1866)
(where
settlor's deed specifically disclaimed creation of present interests) ; Beaumont's Estate,
214 Pa. 445, 63 Att. 1023 (1906) (a life insurance trust held to be for settlor's personal convenience) and Hurley's Estate, 16 Pa. D. & C. 521 (Orphans' Ct. Phila.
1931) (which followed Frederick's Appeal to invalidate a trust reserving no power
of control to settlor).
60. Trusts, Inter Vivos or Testamentary? For What Purposes? 99 U. PA. L.
REv. 870, 880-81 (1951).
61. See e.g., Pengelly Estate, 374 Pa. 358, 364, 97 A.2d 844, 847 (1953).
62. Mason's Estate, 395 Pa. 485, 150 A.2d 542 (1959) ; Shapley's Trust, 353 Pa.
499, 46 A.2d 22 (1946) ; Reese's Estate, 317 Pa. 473, 177 Atl. 792 (1931) ; Windolph
v. Girard Trust Co., 245 Pa. 349, 91 Atl. 634 (1914); Lines v. Lines, 142 Pa. 149,
21 Atl. 809 (1891) ; Dickerson's Appeal, 115 Pa. 198, 8 Atl. 64 (1886) ; Lyon's Trust,
164 Pa. Super. 140, 63 A.2d 415 (1949).
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affected if A authorizes the trustee to invest the corpus as it considers
best without restriction to legal investments. The trustee will manage
the trust as best it can and pay net income and the remainder as directed
by the terms of the trust. Now suppose that A instructs B bank to
invest the corpus pursuant to his directions. Since the trustee could
be given the broadest powers of investment, A's control does not
necessarily alter investment policy. The returns from such investment
are still governed by the trust's dispositionary terms and the protections embodied in trust law generally. Why then is the validity of the
trust destroyed by A's control of its management? If A wanted control
over the trust management, he could have named himself a co-trustee
and the trust's existence would not be thereby impaired.6 3 He could
go one step further and name himself as sole trustee. Obviously, a
settlor under a declaration of trust retains complete control over management. A declaration can even allow the settlor-trustee to make
unrestricted types of investment. No one at this point would question
that declarations of trust are valid in Pennsylvania.64 But the authorities have suggested that when a settlor makes a declaration of trust he
has only a limited control over the res even with a life estate and power
of revocation. This is so, they say, because the settlor-trustee's management and control is governed and regulated by the trust's terms and
the law enunciating his fiduciary duties-he cannot deal as he likes with
the property.6 5 This contention overlooks the fact that any time the
settlor desires to deal with the property as he likes, he can revoke the
trust. At any rate, the settlor-trustee retains as much or more control
over the administration and management of the trust as the settlor
who names a third party trustee but retains control over trust management. In both situations disposition of income and corpus are
equally subject to the trust's terms. To hold the former valid inter
vivos and the latter testamentary is to fly in the face of reason.
In practice, the "details of administration" rule has resulted in
utterly inconsistent decisions. In Tunnell Estate,66 the settlor regis63. E.g., Glosser's Trust, 355 Pa. 210, 49 A.2d 401 (1946) where settlor was
co-trustee.
64. Dickerson's Appeal, 115 Pa. 198, 8 Atd. 64 (1886); RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS,
§ 57 comment b (1935). Cf., Tunnell's Estate, 325 Pa. 554, 190 Atl. 906 (1937).
However, the RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS, § 57, states that if the settlor declares himself trustee and reserves a life estate, power of revocation and the right to deal with
the property as he .likes, it is testamentary.

65. RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS, § 57, comment b (1935); SCOTT, TRUSTS, § 57.6
(2d ed. 1956).
66. 325 Pa. 554, 190 Atl. 906 (1937). Tunnell is the first direct holding based on
settlor's control over the res. In Windolph v. Girard Trust Co., 245 Pa. 349, 91
Atl. 634 (1914), the court found no evidence that the settlor continued to exercise his
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tered certain bonds in his name as trustee for designated persons. He
also wrote letters declaring himself trustee but conditioning the trust
on his retaining full power to receive interest and to sell the bonds;
however, he reaffirmed the obligations of his personal representative
to transfer the bonds to the beneficiaries when he died. As to one bond,
the settlor wrote on the back of an envelope that it would become the
property of a named person at his death. The bonds were kept in
the settlor's deposit box until his death. The contest was between the
cestuis que trust and the settlor's widow who took against his will.
The supreme court held that the evidence was too uncertain and in67
definite to show that the settlor intended to create personal trusts.
The court also said that the settlor's letters showed that he retained
such dominion over the bonds that no rights vested in the beneficiaries,
citing Section 57 of the first Restatement of Trusts. Declarations of
trust, even where the settlor retained a life estate and power to revoke,
were expressly approved, but the court felt that the settlor here had
retained the power to deal with the property as he liked.
Vederman Estate,6" decided in Philadelphia's orphans' court by
Judge Mark Lefever, is a similar holding. There the settlor who died
in 1949, stated in his will that he had made no provision for his wife
or daughter therein because he had provided for them from other
sources. The evidence indicated that no such provision had been made.
In 1945, the settlor had transferred property in trust. Income was
payable to him for life, remainder to seven charities, and he had
retained a power to revoke the trust. The powers given the trustees
were exercisable by them only if and when the settlor so directed and
the trustees' duty was to follow his directions. The court held that
the wife, taking against the will, could also take against the "testamentary" trust. The trust was testamentary because under the
"details of administration" rule, the trustees were mere agents of the
settlor, who also had an unlimited right to revoke, to amend and to
speculate with the property. Significantly the court also emphasized
that it would "not lightly" exclude his widow from the trust res, and
that her claim ".

.

. will be viewed . . . in a benign spirit, intent upon

protection of her rights."
right as owner, but intimated that if such evidence were present the trust would be
voided as testamentary. See Bullock's Estate, 79 Pa. D. & C. 389 (Orphans' Ct.
Dauph. 1951), following Tunnell.
67. The court distinguished Dickerson's Appeal, 115 Pa. 198, 8 Atl. 64 (1886)
and Smith's Estate, 144 Pa. 428, 22 Ati. 916 (1891) as cases where settlor's intention
to create a trust clearly appeared, as opposed to the instant case.
68. 78 Pa. D. & C. 207 (Orphans' Ct. Phila. 1951).
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However, in the same year that the orphans' court decided
Vederman, the supreme court upheld an inter vivos trust giving the
settlor broad power in Sheasley Trust."9 There a father had transferred
real and personal property to his sons who immediately executed a
declaration of trust, but the court treated the father as a settlor. Income
was payable to him during his life and after his death to his children
or their issue. He had also retained the right to "manage, lease, sell
or otherwise dispose of any or all of [the res] . . . and receive the
entire income or proceeds." One of the settlor's sons and one of his
grandsons had assigned their claims under his will (but not his trust)
to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, so that if the trust were
testamentary, the FDIC took their interests. The court held that the
trust was valid and created immediate rights in the beneficiaries,
although enjoyment was postponed until the settlor's death. The court
construed the settlor's power to sell the trust property and retain the
funds as the equivalent of a power to revoke and reaffirmed the principle that a life estate, plus a power to revoke, does not invalidate a
trust. But the settlor had also reserved a power to "manage" and this
would seem to bring Sheasley within the holding of Tunnell's Estate,
supra. The court distinguished Tunnell on the fact that there the trusts
were created by informal letter and by registering the bonds in
the settlor's name as trustee. In Sheasley, the court emphasized the
"formality of the transaction", saying that with a formal deed of trust
it was less likely that the trustee was the settlor's agent.
It was hoped that, with Sheasley Trust and its emphasis on
formality, the supreme court was moving toward renunciation of the
"details of administration" doctrine."0 But these hopes were dashed
when the supreme court considered and struck down an inter vivos
trust in Pengelly Estate,71 which on its face was, if anything, less
offensive than the trust which the court had upheld in Sheasley. In
Pengelly, the settlor had executed a formal deed of trust and transferred securities to a trustee. Income was payable to the settlor for
life and remainder was payable to a "housekeeper". The settlor also
reserved the right to invade the corpus, and the trustee was to manage
and invest the property with the approval of the settlor during his
lifetime. At the settlor's death his wife took against his will and
attacked the trust as testamentary. The court agreed, basing its decision
on the "details of administration" doctrine, citing the Shapley Trust
69. 366 Pa. 316, 77 A.2d 448 (1951).

70. Trusts Inter Vivos or Testaimentary? For What Purpose?, 99 U. PA. L.

R-v. 879, 880-81 (1951).
71. 374 Pa. 358, 97 A.2d 844 (1953).
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dictum. It found the settlor had retained not only a life estate and
power to revoke but also complete control over the trust's management,
despite the language in the deed requiring the trustee to manage with
the settlor's approval. The court relied heavily on the fact that prior
to the trust's creation, the trustee had bought and sold securities for
the settlor. The trustee testified that he had made investment recommendations to the settlor, who accepted or rejected them. After the
trust's creation, the same procedure was followed as to investments,
although the securities were transferred to the trustee's name. The
court attempted to distinguish Sheasley Trust-where the settlor had a
direct right of management- on the ground that there was no "agency
relationship" in that case. Also emphasized was the status of the
claimants; although the widow could not take against the trust under
the Estates Act of 1947, the court held that act confirmatory of a "long
existing public policy ... to protect the rights of widows"."2 The court
did not even mention the formality of the deed which it had found
so important in Sheasley, and Pengelly and Sheasley must be viewed
as irreconcilable on an analysis of their facts. The fact that there had
been a prior agency relationship in Pengelly did not alter the powers
retained by the settlor. That the settlor had gone to the trouble of
preparing a formal deed creating interests in parties who had none
theretofor and had conveyed to the trustee property previously held
by him indicated that he intended to create something more than the
prior "agency relationship." In fact, the settlor in Sheasley retained
stronger and more direct control over the trust management than in
Pengelly, and both documents were of similar formality. The real
distinction is that the upholding of the trust in Sheasley benefited the
objects of the settlor's bounty at the expense of the FDIC, and nullifying the trust in Pengelly benefited the settlor's wife at the expense of
the "housekeeper".
It is also interesting to compare Pengelly Estate with the earlier
case of Windolph v. Girard Trust Co.7" There the settlor transferred
assets in trust to her elderly mother as trustee, income to the settlor
for life with annuities after her death and the remainder to her brothers'
issue and charity. The settlor also reserved a right to revoke and the
trustee could invest in non-legals only with the settlor's written consent.
The evidence showed that the trustee was reluctant to act as trustee
unless she could be relieved of the details of administration, and she
72. id. at 369, 97 A. 2d at 849. The trust preceded the Estates Act of 1947,
PA. STAT. tit. 20 § 301.11 (1947). The solicitude for the wife is diluted somewhat by
the fact that she and settlor had been separated for 39 years preceding his death.
73. 245 Pa. 349, 91 Atl. 634 (1914).
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consulted the settlor and her attorneys on investments. Th2 referee
further found that for ten years prior to the trust, the trustee had been
in the habit of submitting mortgage investments to the settlor and had
consulted her on mortgage investments74 after the trust's creation.
Despite this control over administration and evidence of investment
consultation prior to the trust's creation, the court held the trust valid
inter vivos. Pengelly distinguished Windolph on the ground that the
trustee could invest in legals without consultation and ignored the
evidence of prior relationships.
The supreme court's recent decision in Mason Estate,75 does not
particularly clear the air. In that case, a legatee contended, in behalf
of himself and creditors, that a real estate trust was testamentary where
the settlor reserved a life estate and power to revoke, and directed the
remainder be paid after his death to income and then remainder beneficiaries. The trustee could mortgage or sell real estate but during the
settlor's life, only with his consent. Actually, the settlor had mortgaged
two properties by having the trustee reconvey executing the mortgage
and then conveying again to the trustee. The legatee emphasized these
activities plus the settlor's life estate and power to revoke, relying on
Pengelly and Shapely. The court held the trust valid inter vivos,
relying on Windolph v. Girard Trust Co., supra, and Shapley Trust.
The court quoted a long passage from Shaplev, including the "details
of administration" dictum, and the citation of Frederick's Appeal, but
held the Mason trust not governed by that doctrine, Pengelly Estate was
distinguished because it merely continued the previously existing agency.
As the precedents now stand, one never knows how the court will
decide when an inter vivos trust is attacked as testamentary. It is
possible to point to the factors that courts consider in deciding whether
to uphold or to invalidate such trusts but it is not possible to predict
which factors the courts will emphasize in any given case. Even the
strongest case is not entirely free from doubt. Many decisions have
held that the settlor's retention of a life estate and power to revoke
does not render a trust testamentary. Yet in Hurley's Estate, supra.,
these factors were considered strong evidence of a testamentary intent.
Of course, Hurley relies on Frederick's Appeal, and the "personal
convenience" doctrine of that case was declared dead in Curry Appeal.
Unfortunately, the court frequently quotes the passage in Shapley Trust
74. Id. at 355-57, 91 Atl. at 636. In the Windolph case the trustee could have
invested in legals, but not non-legals without the settlor's consent. The referee indicated that the trustee made the final decision on mortgages, "but always after consultation with Mrs. Windolph" (the settlor). In the Pengelly case, the settlor had
veto power under the document.
75. 395 Pa. 485, 150 A.2d 542 (1959).
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which includes a citation of Frederick's Appeal. This was done in
Mason Estate, which the supreme court decided after Curry, and thus
Mason seems to cite Frederick'sAppeal with approval, suggesting that
the ghost of Frederick's Appeal still haunts the law.
Most of the other factors which the courts consider are inconsistently applied. Thus, one factor which courts apparently construe
as indicating a testamentary intent is whether the trust corpus is
payable to remaindermen at the settlor's death as in Hurley's Estate
and Tunnell Estate. Yet in Shapley's Trust, that factor did not render
the trust testamentary. Another element considered by the courts is
the relationship of claimants involved. Frequently, as in Pengelly,
Hurley and Vederman, the court will void a trust to enable the widow
to share the res, or as in Sheasley Estate, will uphold a trust in favor
of beneficiaries against assignees. A court may even attempt to intuit
the actual intention of a settlor, as in Hurley's Estate, despite the
apparent validity of the trust instrument. The fact that the settlor
retained power to control management of administration of the trust
was significant in invalidating trusts in Tunnell Estate, Vederman
Estate, and Pengelly Estate, but was minimized in Sheasley Estate.
Another factor sometimes of importance is the formality with
which the trust was created. Thus, in Tunnell Estate, trusts were
ignored where they were created by letters or writing on the backs of
envelopes. In Sheasley Estate, a trust was held valid because great
emphasis was placed on the formality of its creation. Yet, in Pengelly
Estate, similar formality was ignored in holding a trust testamentary.
The hope that Sheasley presaged the demise of the "details of administration" rule has not been realized, since Pengelly Estate followed
that rule and Mason Estate mentions it with approval. On the other
hand, the decision in Mason Estate indicates that the supreme court is
moving to restrict Pengelly to its facts, and the extent of the "details
of administration" rule must therefore await further clarification.
Pengelly's Estate may yet become the Frederick's Appeal of the
twentieth century.
Trusts Revocable For Fraud Or Mistake.
There is another line of cases under whose authority valid inter
vivos trusts which are expressly irrevocable can be revoked, usually
by the settlor. Illustrative of these decisions is Rick's Appeal,7 where
a 75 year-old woman had executed a deed of trust, income to herself
76. 105 Pa. 528 (1884).
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for life remainder to her children. There was no power of revocation
and in fact the settlor had been expressly told that such a clause could
not be included. Such a misrepresentation was a palpable fraud, sufficient in itself to render the trust voidable. When the settlor petitioned
to revoke the trust, the fraud was given the short shrift it deserved,
and the trust was revoked. The result is perfectly proper, but the
rationale is untidy. The court held the case to be on all fours with
Frederick'sAppeal, thus a mere agency or will, revocable at any time,
and Rick's Appeal has been cited as one of the "personal convenience"
cases. During this earlier period, the existence of an inter vivos trust
without a power of revocation was viewed with extreme suspicion.
Russel's Estate,77 created a virtual presumption of fraud in the absence
78
of a power of revocation, and this presumption has had its vogue.
The doctrine has been outgrown, but its basis was fraud, and the intrusion of the "personal convenience" doctrine, with its "mere agency"
79
and "no present interest" jargon has only muddied the waters.
The Rick's Appeal type cases cause no difficulty on their facts. But
care must be used to see that the more generalized principles used as
the basis for such decisions are not taken seriously.
The No Present Interests Rule.
It is Hornbook law that a will creates no present interests, while
a trust inter vivos does. Thus, in every case where a court has struck
down a trust as testamentary, it has additionally stated that the trust
created no new interests. Such "holdings" are so obviously conclusions
rather than bases for decision that they need not be considered further.
The only decision which actually turned on the absence of present
interests is Turner v. Scott,"' where the settlor specifically stated that
"this conveyance in no way to take effect . . . (until settlor's death)."
The existence of present interests is of importance in decisions determining whether the settlor can terminate an inter vivos trust. It is
77. 75 Pa. 269 (1874).
78. See e.g., Sturgeon v. Stevens, 186 Pa. 350, 40 Atd. 488 (1898); Hood v.
Leach, 29 Pa. Dist. 517 (C.P. Phila. 1920).
79. Of course, any trust can be revoked when it is made irrevocable by mistake or fraud, but the burden of showing fraud is on the complainant. Curry's Appeal,
390 Pa. 105, 134 A.2d 497 (1957). An attempt was also made to apply a more
generalized fraud doctrine to nullify inter vivos trusts. In Windolph v. Girard Trust
Co., 245 Pa. 349, 91 Att. 634 (1914) and Bierne v. Continental Equitable Title &
Trust Co., 307 Pa. 570, 161 Atl. 721 (1932), it was claimed that such trusts were
a fraud on the dower rights of settlors' wives. The contention was rejected, since
Pennsylvania law specifically recognized the husband's right to make such transfers,
despite the effect on dower rights. But see Hill's Estate, 15 Pa. D. & C. 699
(Orphans' Ct. Phila. 1931).
80. 51 Pa. 126 (1866).
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settled that a trust cannot be terminated except with the consent of all
persons with any interest in the trust." For a settlor to terminate a
trust, he must either be the sole party in interest or have the consent
of all such parties. His right to terminate thus often hinges on the
nature of the remaindermen, even if he has a power to appoint.
If the gift in default of appointment is to his estate (or heirs, prior
to the abolition of the rule in Shelley's Case), then the settlor has
been allowed to terminate.812 If the remainder gifts are to children,
issue or other such named persons or classes, the settlor is not the sole
party in interest.8 3 Even where the settlor was sole beneficiary some
cases, of which Rehr v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. 4 is repre-

sentative, have refused to permit termination or revocation when
the trust had "spendthrift" provisions applicable to the settlor. Under
these cases, the courts have construed the "spendthrift" provision as
giving the trust a raison d'etre, namely, keeping it out of the settlor's
hands. The fatal flaw in this reasoning is that such "spendthrift" provisions had no effect on the settlor's creditors, 5 so he could deplete
the trust corpus simply by incurring debts.
Although it has been suggested that these cases enunciate Pennsylvania's "peculiar rule of law" that an intemperate settlor cannot
revoke or terminate a trust even if he is sole beneficiary,86 the gravamen
of almost all of these cases has been the presence of the "spendthrift"
provision which gave the trust an unfulfilled purpose. This "peculiar
rule" was wiped out by Bowers' Trust Estate, where the settlor had
a life estate and had acquired the vested remainder by assignment. The
court held that the "spendthrift" provision was a nullity as to the settlor
and allowed termination implicitly overruling the Rehr line of cases.8 8
Bowers was followed and reinforced in Schellentrager v. Tradesmen's
National Bank & Trust Co., 9 in which the settlor had a life estate and

the right to substitute and eliminate beneficiaries. He had eliminated
all beneficiaries and named himself remainderman. The court held that
81. McCreary's Trust, 354 Pa. 347, 47 A.2d 235 (1946); Potter v. Fidelity
Ins. Trust & Safe-Deposit Co. (No. 1), 199 Pa. 360, 49 Atl. 85 (1901) ; Collins v.
Provident Trust Co., 83 Pa. D. & C. 459 (C.P. Mtgy. 1952).
82. Long v. Tradesmen's Nat'l Bank, 108 Pa. Super. 363, 165 At. 56 (1933)
(expressly irrevocable for ten years, held terminable); Reiniger's Estate, 36 Pa.
D. & C. 163 (Orphans' Ct. Berks 1939); Roberts' Estate, 18 Pa. D. & C. 463
(Orphans' Ct. Phila. 1933); Carson's Trust, 31 Del. 311 (C.P. Pa. 1942).
83. See cases cited supra note 81.
84. 310 Pa. 301, 165 AtI. 380 (1933).
85. See cases cited supra notes 4-5.
86. Trusts - Revocation and Termination of Pennsylvania Trusts, 1 VILL. L.
REv. 122, 123-24 (1956).
87. 346 Pa. 85, 29 A.2d 519 (1943).
88. Id. at 88-89, 29 A.2d at 520.
89. 370 Pa. 501, 88 A.2d 773 (1952).
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he was now the sole beneficiary and could terminate despite "spendthrift" provisions. Bowers and Schellentrager are now law, and where
the settlor has a life estate and the remainder is to his estate, or he
has the power to name himself remainderman or to acquire the remainder interests, he should have no difficulty terminating the trust.90
CONCLUSION

It has been suggested by one writer that a court's decision on
whether an inter vivos trust is valid or not will vary with the claimants
involved in the decision." This is no doubt true to some extent but
it is of no help in drafting trusts or planning estates. No one can or
should expect absolute predictability in the law, and especially in the
field of estates and trusts which are concerned with interpreting and
effectuating the intentions of settlors and testators. But courts must
remember that they are not only rendering a decision on a particular
fund but that they are also enunciating rules by which others will try
to be guided. As matters now stand, a cautious draftsman would not
dare give a settlor any powers beyond a life estate and power to revoke
or appoint. And even those powers may go too far if Frederick's
Appeal gets loose again.
It is submitted that courts can do a great deal in the area of inter
vivos trusts to clarify the controlling principles in harmony with today's
realities. The "personal convenience" test of Frederick'sAppeal, which
was declared dead in Curry Appeal, should be buried in silence, and it
would be helpful if courts would stop citing it with seeming approval
every time they quote from Shapley Trust. Rick's Appeal and its
offspring should be restricted to their real rationale of fraud and mistake, and it should be recognized that there is no longer a presumption
of fraud because a trust is irrevocable. The corpus of a settlor-life
tenant's trust should be recognized as equally accessible to creditors,
whether the settlor has retained a power to revoke or to appoint. But
it should be remembered that creditors' rights transcend the rights of
those who claim as beneficiaries, legatees or otherwise and that such
trusts are valid despite the ability of creditors to reach the corpus.
90. See e.g., Chases' Trust, 7 Pa. D.&C.2d 519 (Orphans' Ct. Phila. 1956)
Murdoch's Trust, 5 Pa. D.&C.2d 287 (C.P. Phila. 1956); Kelby's Estate, 80 Pa.
D. & C. 1 (Orphans' Ct. Phila. 1952). However, Rehr v. Fidelity-Philadelphia
Trust Co., 310 Pa. 301, 165 Atl. 380 (1933), was approvingly cited, in passing in
Morton v. Morton, 394 Pa. 402, 406, 407 A.2d 150, 152 (1959).
91. Trusts-Inter Vivos or Testamentary? For What Purposes?, 99 U. PA.
L. Rtv. 879 (1951). Compare, Lines v. Lines, 142 Pa. 149, 21 Atl. 809 (1891) (trust
not testamentary, widow cannot take against it) with Lines Estate, 155 Pa. 378, 26
Ati. 728 (1893) (same trust, inheritance tax payable).
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Finally, and most important, the whole doctrine that a trust is
"testamentary" because a settlor has retained power over the corpus
should be discarded. If a settlor formally creates a trust, it should be
held valid even if he can manage or administer the trust-as trustee,
co-trustee or otherwise-and even if the trust terminates at his death.
The "details of administration" rule is unrealistic in theory and unworkable in practice. It was probably originated to assist disinherited
wives, but the Estates Act of 1947 affords them adequate protection,
and its greatest use today is to afford a disgruntled legatee or beneficiary a colorable basis for a strike suit. In fact, recent thinking in the
field has pointed toward a complete repudiation of this doctrine and
two of the most respected extra-judicial authorities have recently come
around to this viewpoint. The revised Restatement of Trusts has
adopted a new Section 57 stating that a trust disposition is not testamentary even if the settlor retains a life estate, power of revocation
"and a power to control the trustee as to the administration of the
trust." 2 Similarly, Austin W. Scott, in a recent article, states that:
"When the legal title to the trust property is vested in the
trustee by a formal trust instrument, the trustee is not a mere
agent of the settlor, even though the settlor reserves power to
control the trustee as to the administration of the trust."9 "
The adoption of this rule in Pennsylvania, accompanied by a
clarification of the related but specialized principles discussed above,
would go far toward strengthening the usefulness of the inter vivos
trust and giving the estate planner peace.
92. RESTATMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS, § 57 (1959).
93. Scott, Hanson v. Denckla, 72 HARV. L. Rxv. 695, 697 (1959).
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